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INTRODUCTION 
Around 1964, military information systems employees coined the term 
“data base” to describe repositories of data accessible by users across time-
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shared computer systems.1  Today, “database” is a word that requires no 
definition.  In thirty short years, it progressed from two disconnected de-
scriptive nouns to a hazy concept stitched together by a hyphen to a single 
word instantly understandable to every member of a modern society.  In-
deed, databases are such an integral component of contemporary life that it 
is easy to forget just how new they are.  Like other currently indispensable 
technologies—personal computers, cell phones, e-mail—it can be hard to 
remember just how things worked before they came into existence.  
A wide variety of government databases have flourished in the criminal 
justice field over the past ten to twenty years.  Much legal scholarly atten-
tion, including some of my own,2 has been devoted to the impact of these 
databases on individual privacy, whether as a general normative matter or 
in relation to specific constitutional doctrines such as the Fourth Amend-
ment.  But this Article focuses on something different than general con-
cerns about privacy.  Indeed, it takes it as a given that databases affect per-
sonal privacy, even while acknowledging that reasonable people disagree 
about how severe or grave the impact of databases may be. 
This Article is a preliminary effort to sketch some of the challenges that 
large-scale databasing poses to conventional constitutional analysis.  In 
Herring v. United States,3 the Supreme Court engaged in its first head-on 
confrontation with criminal justice databases in some time. To many scho-
lars, Herring’s greatest significance is that it bolsters suspicions that a ma-
jority of the Court views the proper application of the exclusionary rule as 
limited to instances of deliberate malfeasance.  Yet Herring is a difficult 
call on the question of malfeasance, given the nature of the constitutional 
violation claimed.  Rather than involve a run of the mill bad call on proba-
ble cause or reasonable suspicion, Herring dealt with a kind of mistake that 
increasingly can and does occur in contemporary policing:  an error in a 
computerized database.  And, indeed, in their assessments of the nature of 
the constitutional error, the majority and the dissenters exposed some fun-
damental problems that arise when claims related to databases are at stake.   
This Article takes the fault lines exposed by Herring as a point of depar-
ture for considering these issues more generally.  Specifically, this Article 
questions whether the practice of databasing comports or conflicts with the 
assumptions that animate the investigative and adjudicative restraints im-
posed by the Constitution—generally, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amend-
ments.  Part I begins by sketching, very briefly, the evolution of databases 
 
 1. See Thomas Haigh, “A Veritable Bucket of Facts”: Origins of the Data Base Man-
agement System, SIGMOD REC., June 2006, at 33, 35. 
 2. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2008). 
 3. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
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in criminal justice by providing a sampling of databases in existence.  Part 
II then examines the few major instances in which the Supreme Court has 
commented on databases or databasing in the context of criminal justice, in 
order to glean different themes that have emerged.  Part III then identifies 
five presumptions that seem to attach to database-related inquiries, while 
Part IV sets out some thoughts about how constitutional doctrine might 
evolve to the particular needs of databases, in order to better regulate and 
safeguard their use in the criminal justice system. 
I.  THE RISE OF DATABASES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
A. Proto-Databases 
The criminal justice system’s reliance on databases is both old and new.  
As many know, the formal, organized, public police first emerged as a con-
cept around 1829, when Robert Peel organized the London bobbies.4  The 
first detective unit in the United States was formed shortly after in 1846 in 
Boston,5 at a time when tracking down criminals largely remained a private 
sector gig.  Dominated by companies such as the (in)famous Pinkertons,6 
the unit’s work consisted largely of pounding the pavement (and suspects).  
Indeed, many of the modern tools of detecting—“[s]ophisticated criminal 
investigation techniques—well-organized crime records systems, finger-
prints, crime labs—did not appear until the twentieth century.”7  Even Al-
phonse Bertillion’s pioneer anthropometrical system of identification in the 
late 1800s depended largely upon manual recording and comparison of 
measurements.8 
The first primitive databases emerged around the same time, at the turn 
of the century.  For instance, as early as 1919, the California State Bureau 
of Identification introduced a punch-card system for storing and retrieving 
modus operandi information.9  But perhaps the watershed moment of gov-
ernment databasing occurred in the early 1930s, around the time that J. Ed-
 
 4. For a thorough and encyclopedic account of the evolution of policing, see David A. 
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999). 
 5. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 204 
(1993).  Peel had organized a small detective unit in 1842 in London.  Sklansky, supra note 
4, at 1204 & n.203. 
 6. Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1212-14. 
 7. SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
160 (2d ed. 1998). 
 8. SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CEN-
TURY 40 (2000). 
 9. SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL 
IDENTIFICATION 250-51 (2001). 
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gar Hoover opened the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s first criminal evi-
dence laboratory, which included fingerprint processing capacities, hair, 
blood, and firearm analysis.10  As part of the new emphasis on forensic 
science, FBI implemented its first fingerprint database—a card sorter that 
capitalized on the technology created to tabulate the census and that led to 
the formation of IBM.11 
Just a little over a decade later, the development of the mainframe com-
puter in 1946 and the replacement of punch cards with magnetic tape sig-
nificantly advanced databasing possibilities,12 but it remained a largely 
primitive technology.  By as late as 1984, the federal fingerprint database—
the most advanced forensic database available—still depended primarily on 
manual recording and retrieval.  At best, it served as an efficient means of 
organizing cards for retrieval, rather than for generating leads or links.13  
Linking two fingerprints required manual comparison of an unknown scene 
sample with, for instance, the 23 million criminal cards on file with the 
FBI.14 
The 1980s, however, initiated a period of rapid change.  Personal com-
puters became commonly available.  Law enforcement began to recognize 
and harness the potential of electronic storage and retrieval.  And then, re-
markably, the Internet was born.  Connectivity became possible in ways 
previously unimagined, and storage capacity reached new heights.  The 
foundations for the modern criminal justice databases had been set. 
The first major advance occurred around 1985, when technology simpli-
fied the creation of digital images from physical fingerprint cards, enabling 
the National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (“AFIS”).  AFIS 
software allowed a technician to conduct both confirmatory matches as 
well as automated comparisons between known and unknown prints, a 
landmark advance over the old manual methods of comparison.15  In a 1987 
report on the creation of AFIS, the authors noted that a San Francisco in-
vestigation had expended thousands of man-hours searching fingerprint 
 
 10. WALKER, supra note 7, at 160.  Dan Richman’s account of the rise of federal law 
enforcement in the 1930s relates the FBI’s efforts to interest generated in the wake of the 
Lindbergh baby’s kidnapping.  Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent 
Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 386-88 (2006). 
 11. GARFINKEL, supra note 8, at 18. 
 12. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFOR-
MATION AGE 14 (2004). 
 13. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification Sys-
tem, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2010) (describing that 
“[j]ust a few years ago . . . fingerprint cards had to be physically transported and processed.”  
Thus a check “could often take three months to complete.”). 
 14. GARFINKEL, supra note 8, at 44. 
 15. Id. at 45. 
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records for the one clear print an alleged killer had left behind; when that 
print became the subject of San Francisco’s first automated search, a match 
was found in six minutes.16  But AFIS still relied upon manual scanning of 
a card ink stain image, and thus that slowed response time and transmission 
capacity.  The imperfection of the images also diminished automated 
matching capacity. 
Also, in 1983, as a companion to AFIS, the FBI created the Interstate 
Identification Index (“III”), a pointer index which linked states to criminal 
records of both arrest and conviction that are associated with uploaded fin-
gerprints.17  The Index is operated through the National Criminal Informa-
tion Center (“NCIC”), which has served since the late 1960s as the central 
federal criminal records database.18 
But even though the idea of the criminal justice database has existed for 
over a hundred years—although records and fingerprints have been created 
and kept for most of that time—it would be wrong to assume that contem-
porary databases are simply the younger siblings of the databases just de-
scribed.  They are not.  Old databases were typically paper files or punch 
cards that were physically kept and stored in diffused, and at times difficult 
to access, locations.  Even the AFIS and III systems of the 1980s relied 
heavily on manual inputs and outputs of records.  And proactive searching 
was likewise all but impossible because technology could not automatically 
sift through huge volumes of standardized material.  Thus, an act as simple 
as switching locations might be effective in obscuring one’s identity, since 
accessing a record created and stored even in the next town over could be 
prohibitively difficult.  In short, until quite recently, the database primarily 
served an organizational and confirmatory function—if law enforcement 
had a known suspect, then a database enabled easier access to confirmatory 
information about that person. 
B. Databases Today 
In 1999, databasing radically changed when the Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (“IAFIS”) became operational.19  IAFIS 
is now the largest single biometric database, and it looks nothing like the 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of 
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 181-82 (2008). 
 18. Congress had authorized the collection of criminal records and fingerprints as early 
as 1924, 43 Stat. 217, but it did not computerize them centrally until after the mid-century. 
 19. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification Sys-
tem, supra note 13. 
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fingerprint databases that preceded it.20  IAFIS replaced the old ink-and-
card system with a new, immediate digital image that could be easily 
stored, transmitted, and searched.  Rather than locate a physical card and 
conduct a visual comparison, or even—as with the precursor AFIS sys-
tem—electronically search images of physical cards, IAFIS kept an actual 
direct digital image of the print itself in high enough resolution to record 
and classify characteristics.  And, because remote locations could imme-
diately upload or retrieve direct records, IAFIS transformed the signific-
ance of the FBI’s cache of information.  Sharing and searching functions 
were dramatically enhanced.  As it currently stands, IAFIS contains the 
records of over 55 million subjects in its Master File,21 which can be auto-
matically searched twenty-four hours a day every day of the year, and that 
number grows daily. 
Also in 1999, the FBI implemented a new generation of NCIC technolo-
gy, which represented a series of advances over the prior system.  New fea-
tures included “the addition of image processing (i.e., mugshots, signatures, 
and identifying marks); automated single-finger fingerprint matching; and 
information linking, which provides the ability to associate logically related 
records across NCIC files for the same criminal or the same crime.”22  
Most importantly, the new system “automates functions that employees 
previously had to perform manually,” including collection and evaluation 
of the system.23  Whereas in 1967 the National Criminal Information Cen-
ter served roughly 2 million requests annually, that number has now 
climbed to 2.5 million per day.24 
Moreover, the NCIC folds in many additional databases.  For instance, 
because the 1993 Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act (popularly 
known as the Brady Act) necessitated the creation of a reliable national 
background check system, Congress allocated funds to help update the over 
70 million criminal records held by the fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia.25  As of 1998, that goal had largely been achieved, and a rapid and 
quick national records system, called the National Instant Criminal Back-
ground Check System (“NICS”) had been created.26  The NCIC 2000 sys-
tem also added the Convicted Sexual Offender Registry and the Convicted 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Stephanie Hitt, NCIC 2000, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., July 2000, at 12, available 
at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2000/jul00leb.pdf. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 12. 
 25. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 17, at 180. 
 26. Id. at 181 (estimating that it processes roughly “eight million firearm purchase 
background checks annually”). 
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Persons on Supervised Release database to augment old standards such as 
the outstanding warrant files.27  In addition, around the same time that IA-
FIS went online, the FBI launched the Combined DNA Index System 
(“CODIS”).  This database is essentially a pointer system to DNA profiles 
typed by state and federal agents, and it currently contains over 7.9 million 
offender known profiles and almost 300,000 forensic unknown profiles.28 
But IAFIS and CODIS are simply the tip of the iceberg.  It was esti-
mated in 2001 that federal agencies and departments today maintain rough-
ly 2000 databases.29  Those databases cover a wide variety of topics, rang-
ing from those directly related to criminal justice purposes to those 
applicable only in the most specialized circumstances.  There are gang da-
tabases,30 terrorist watch lists,31 violent criminal databases,32 forensic refer-
ence databases,33 corrections databases, and a wide variety of public and 
private databases ranging from security industry to identity theft to gaming 
industry databases.34 
C. Databases Tomorrow 
Databasing is here to stay, and the future promises the creation of more 
of them, used in increasingly novel ways.  To give just one example, in the 
wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and in response to con-
gressional and executive mandates to facilitate information sharing among 
and within the criminal justice and national security communities, a great 
deal of attention has surrounded the creation of communication structures 
across various state and federal entities.  Most notably, forty-three “fusion 
centers” across the nation have received roughly $380 million dollars in 
 
 27. Hitt, supra note 22, at 14. 
 28. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, CODIS-NDIS Statistics, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/ 
codis/clickmap.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2010). 
 29. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for In-
formation Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1403 (2001). 
 30. See, e,g., James B. Jacobs, Gang Databases: Context and Questions, 8 J. CRIMINOL-
OGY & PUB. POL’Y 705, 705-06 (2009), available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/ 
cgi-bin/fulltext/122687667/PDFSTART (describing various databases). 
 31. See The Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Desig-
nated Nationals and Blocked Persons, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/ 
t11sdn.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). 
 32. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Violent Criminal Apprehension Program, 
http://foia.fbi.gov/vicappia.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2010). 
 33. Robin Bowen & Jessica Schneider, Forensic Databases: Paint, Shoe Prints, and 
Beyond, NIJ JOURNAL NO. 258 (2007). 
 34. Solove, supra note 29, at 1401-05. 
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federal grants.35  These centers integrate federal, state, and local officials 
under one roof, and although their initial mandate was to focus specifically 
on terrorism-related investigations, “they have increasingly gravitated to-
ward an all-crimes and even broader all-hazards approach.”36  Fusion cen-
ters rely intensively on information gathered by other entities.  That is, they 
execute their mission in part by accessing and coordinating an extraordi-
nary number of public and private database systems, including motor ve-
hicle, location, criminal records, corrections, sex offender, public health, 
and industry databases.37 
According to some reports, the FBI has also announced plans to replace 
IAFIS with a new multimodal biometric database that will incorporate 
DNA, facial imaging, iris scans, palm and voice prints, and identifying in-
formation in one integrated system.38  This announcement follows in the 
wake of the REAL-ID Act of 2005, which aimed to create a de facto na-
tional identity card, but has been met with strong opposition from both 
states and individual privacy advocates.39  Again, however, these examples 
are simply two among many, intended only to provide some insight into the 
breadth of databasing likely to occur in the future.  After all, at present 
there are even plans for a doggie DNA database.40 
II.  THE DATABASE IN CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
The preceding section should, at the least, make two points abundantly 
clear: first, that there are an enormous number of databases in the criminal 
justice system, and second, that the database, as it exists today, has really 
only been around for ten or so years.  Any person who has witnessed the 
past fifteen years of technological advancement knows, without reading a 
law review article, that online databases have transformed modern life.  Yet 
surprisingly few changes have occurred in actual constitutional doctrine in 
response to widespread databasing. 
 
 35. See TODD MASSE, SIOBHAN O’NEIL & JOHN ROLLINS, FUSION CENTERS: ISSUES AND 
OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS app. B (2007). 
 36. Id. at i. 
 37. Id. at 33-34. 
 38. Ellen Messmer, FBI Building System That Blows Away Fingerprinting, NETWORK 
WORLD, Sept. 23, 2009, available at http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/092309-fbi-
biometrics.html?ts. 
 39. Real ID Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302; see, e.g., Four Western 
States Allow Illegal Immigrant Licenses, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 18, 2009 (noting criti-
cisms of REAL ID and efforts to change it). 
 40. See Marc W. Allard, Building a Genetic Reference Database for Dog mtDNA se-
quences and SNPs (May 2009) (unpublished final report funded by the U.S. Department of 
Justice), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226936.pdf. 
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Last Term, the Court confronted the applicability of the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule to a police database error in Herring v. United 
States.41  Considered a watershed moment in criminal procedure, inasmuch 
as the Court approved the admission of evidence acquired from an uncons-
titutional search justified by a police database entry that proved erroneous, 
the debate in Herring presages the kinds of concerns likely to confront a 
variety of constitutional criminal procedure doctrines in the coming years.  
Before turning to the Court’s reasoning in that case, however, it may be 
useful to look at previous instances in which the Court addressed—even 
outside of the criminal context—law enforcement-related databases, in or-
der to see the different ways in which the Court has assessed the constitu-
tional significance of databasing generally. 
A. Major Database Cases 
The Supreme Court has directly addressed and confronted the signific-
ance of databases on only a handful of occasions, few of which were very 
recent.42  In fact, perhaps the two most significant cases were issued more 
than twenty years ago.  The few remaining cases only peripherally address 
the significance of databasing, despite being of more recent vintage.43  
Thus, the current Court’s view of databases, and how they might influence 
or alter the conventional approaches to constitutional regulation, remains 
largely obscured. 
For instance, in the 1977 case Whalen v. Roe, the Court confronted a 
state statute that ordered the creation of a central database containing the 
names and addresses of persons who had obtained certain prescription 
drugs in order to combat prescription fraud.44  The challengers, a group of 
 
 41. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
 42. In addition to the cases discussed at length below, the Court also addressed or men-
tioned databases in two additional cases: Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 692 (1996) 
(referring to Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System database) and Hiibel v. 
Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 196 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“A name can provide the key to a broad array of information about the person, particularly 
in the hands of a police officer with access to a range of law enforcement databases.”). 
 43. The Court has confronted database-related issues peripherally in a handful of non-
criminal justice cases as well. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Elec. Bd., 553 U.S. 
181, 219 n.23 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting problems with Bureau of Motor Ve-
hicles database in case related to voter identification statute); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
187, 250 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the utility of “computer-accessible 
databases . . . to facilitate research and learning” in copyright cases); N.Y. Times v. Tasini, 
533 U.S. 483 (2001) (resolving copyright action against publishers operating electronic da-
tabases); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997) (raising likelihood that state offi-
cials, rather than federal ones, will be blamed for mistakes in databases related to firearm 
background checks). 
 44. 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977). 
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doctors and patients, alleged that the statute violated substantive due 
process because it impinged upon “their interest in the nondisclosure of 
private information and also their interest in making important decisions 
independently.”45  The government, in turn, argued that the scheme was 
necessary to control the illegal market in such drugs. 
In upholding the statutory scheme, the Court described the databasing 
process in detail.  It noted that the prescriptions were written in triplicate, 
and one copy was transported to Albany monthly.46  They were then sorted, 
coded, and logged into a computer and stored on magnetic tape.  The phys-
ical forms were kept for five years, whereupon they were destroyed.  The 
tapes themselves were kept in a locked cabinet and were only run “off-line” 
in a single room.  Only seventeen employees could access the files, and on-
ly twenty-four investigators could investigate.  In other words, the system 
in place closely regulated both the physical copy of the information as well 
as the data storage mechanism, search method, and retrieval.  The Court al-
so observed that penalties applied to any person who willfully violated the 
system.47  Attentive to the safeguards taken to protect the information from 
inappropriate disclosure, the Court proclaimed that it “therefore need not, 
and [will] not, decide any question which might be presented by the unwar-
ranted disclosure of accumulated private data whether intentional or unin-
tentional or by a system that did not contain comparable security provi-
sions.”48 
In a closing passage oft-cited today, Justice Stevens, writing for the 
Court, declared: 
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation 
of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or 
other massive government files.  The collection of taxes, the distribution 
of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision of public health, 
the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal 
laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of information, 
much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or 
harmful if disclosed.  The right to collect and use such data for public 
purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulato-
ry duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.  Recognizing that in some cir-
 
 45. Id. at 600.  Because the doctrine was still evolving, the litigants framed their interest 
under several constitutional provisions; see id. at 600-02 & nn.23-24.  These provisions in-
cluded the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, id. at 603-04 & n.32, but the claim 
sounds in due process today and that was the basis upon which the Court ruled. Id. at 604. 
 46. Id. at 593-95. 
 47. Id. at 594-95 & n.12. 
 48. Id. at 605-06. 
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cumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution, neverthe-
less New York’s statutory scheme [adequately protects privacy].49 
Thus, the Court in 1977 not only contemplated the databasing currently 
underway in the nation but also anticipated the widespread databasing that 
would come in the future.  It deemed databasing necessary, although also 
potentially threatening to personal privacy.  Most intriguingly, the Court 
seemed unconvinced by, although open to, the idea that the Constitution 
would regulate the compilation of databases.  Instead, the Court seemed to 
view the enabling statutes as the proper source of primary regulation—a 
proposition that assumes that databases are formed largely as a result of 
statutory mandate. 
In contrast, Justice Brennan, concurring, explicitly stated that “[b]road 
dissemination by state officials of such information . . . would clearly im-
plicate constitutionally protected privacy rights.”50  Justice Brennan also 
specifically addressed the significance of databasing itself.  He identified 
the troubling aspect of the scheme as “the central computer storage of the 
data thus collected.”51  Although he deemed it “[o]bvious[]” that “collec-
tion and storage of data . . . is not rendered unconstitutional simply because 
new technology makes the State’s operations more efficient,” he recog-
nized that the “central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data 
vastly increase[s] the potential for abuse of that information.”52  Citing, in-
terestingly, to the Fourth Amendment as an example of a means of restric-
tion on information-gathering (as opposed to simple kind-restrictions), Jus-
tice Brennan remarked that “future developments” may “demonstrate the 
necessity of some curb on such technology.”53 
Depending on one’s perspective, the Court either made good on its 
promise or tacked the other direction ten years later in its next major judg-
ment concerning large scale databases, United States Department of Justice 
v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.54  In Reporters Commit-
tee, the Court addressed a claim by a reporter and journalists’ association 
for access under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) to FBI “rap 
sheets.”55  The FBI had compiled rap sheets that contained the name, birth 
 
 49. Id. at 605. 
 50. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).  The other concurring Justice, Justice Stewart, 
sharply disputed this claim, criticizing its citation to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965), and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), as inadequate support for the proposi-
tion. Id. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 51. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 52. Id. at 606-07. 
 53. Id. at 607. 
 54. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
 55. Id. at 751. 
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date, physical characteristics, and criminal records (including arrest, 
charges, convictions, and incarcerations) of over 24 million individuals.56  
The challenge related to the denial of a request by a reporter who sought 
access to the records of members of a reputed mafia family under the fed-
eral FOIA.57 
As in Whalen, the focus of the legal analysis was largely statutory.  The 
enabling statutes that authorized the creation of the rap sheets had been 
amended to limit disclosure, and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) had a 
policy of generally treating them as confidential, except for disclosure to 
the subject of the sheet or for press releases for wanted persons.58  The 
FOIA, in contrast, sets forth a presumption of disclosure of agency 
records.59  However, three exemptions arguably required the DOJ to with-
hold the rap sheets: Exemption 3, requiring compliance with other statutory 
nondisclosure provisions; Exemption 6, protecting certain files that could 
create “a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”; and Exemp-
tion 7(C), applying to law enforcement records that would likewise invade 
privacy.60 
Again writing for the Court, Justice Stevens held that Exemption 7(C) 
prohibited the disclosure of the rap sheet.61  Notably, the Court first had to 
acknowledge the claimed invasion of privacy was to material that, techni-
cally speaking, consisted of almost entirely public information.  Indeed, the 
reporter specifically sought only that information that constituted “matters 
of public record.”62  Of course, the Court observed that a few states prohi-
bited disclosure of out-of-state information or restricted the conditions un-
der which non-conviction information would be disclosed.63  A larger 
number had restrictions on issuing criminal history summaries.64  But indi-
vidually, each piece of information was almost always technically open and 
available as a matter of public record.65  Thus, in order to find that the rap 
sheet implicated any privacy interest, the Court had to acknowledge that 
 
 56. Id. at 751-52. 
 57. Id. at 757. 
 58. Id. at 752.  The statute had further been amended to permit disclosure of rap sheets 
to banking institutions, securities industry regulators, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion. Id. at 753. 
 59. Id. at 755. 
 60. Id. at 755-56 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (6), (7)(C)). 
 61. Id. at 758-59. 
 62. Id. at 757. 
 63. Id. at 753-54 & n.2. 
 64. Id. at 753. 
 65. Id. 
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“much rap-sheet information is a matter of public-record,”66 and specifical-
ly draw a distinction between the technical availability of the information 
and its actual availability (“practical obscurity,” in the Court’s parlance),67 
which it described as “limited.”68 
Rejecting a “cramped notion of personal privacy,”69 Justice Stevens 
commented that “[i]n an organized society, there are few facts that are not 
at one time or another divulged to another.”70  Yet such disclosures did not 
render that information no longer private, given the passage of time and the 
practical impediments to broad dissemination.  Noting that the “very fact 
that federal funds have been spent to prepare, index, and maintain these 
criminal-history files demonstrates that the individual items of information 
. . . would not otherwise be ‘freely available,’”71 Justice Stevens distin-
guished between “scattered disclosure” of bits of information and complete 
and coherent revelation.72 
While the gravamen of the Court’s reasoning rested on a statutory analy-
sis of the provisions involved and the propriety of issuing a categorical 
rule,73 the manner in which it assessed the interests implicated by disclo-
sure granted some insight into its view of databasing generally.  The Court 
noted that the Privacy Act had been enacted specifically to counter con-
cerns about “computer data banks on individual privacy.”74  In the Court’s 
estimation, electronic storage altered the nature of the interest affected, in 
that “the computer can accumulate and store information that would other-
wise have surely been forgotten long before.”75  By holding the records un-
obtainable under the law enforcement exemption, while in no way casting 
aspersions on the statutory mandate to centralize them in the first place, the 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 762. 
 68. Id. at 753. 
 69. Id. at 763. 
 70. Id.  Justice Stevens identified the interest as in “selective” versus total nondisclo-
sure. Id. at 763 n.14 (citing Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls Over the Accu-
racy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 343-44 
(1966)). 
 71. Id. at 764. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 779-80. 
 74. Id. at 766-67 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-1416, at 7 (1974)).  The Court also cited to 
Department of Air Force v. Rose, a sort of proto-database case in which law students re-
quested records of disciplined cadets.  Despite the publicity of some of the cadets’ names, 
the Court noted that the passage of time and informality of public knowledge continued its 
character as “private” sufficiently to deny disclosure under FOIA. Id. at 768-69 (citing 
Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976)). 
 75. Id. at 771. 
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Court seemed to say that such long memories were properly the province of 
the state alone. 
The holding in Reporters Committee contrasts remarkably with that in 
Smith v. Doe, in which the Court upheld the Alaska Sexual Offender Regis-
tration Act against an ex post facto constitutional challenge.76  As in Re-
porters Committee, the case involved a statute that authorized the compila-
tion of publicly available information—here, convictions for sexual 
offenses.77  Unlike Reporters Committee, however, the purpose of the sta-
tute was public dissemination.78  Finding that the statute was civil and regu-
latory, as opposed to punitive, in character, the Court found no violation of 
the constitutional bar against retroactive punishments.79 
Most relevant for this Article, however, was the Court’s treatment of the 
arguments raised by the respondents.  The respondents analogized the crea-
tion of a centralized public database available online to the public stigma 
and shaming of the pillories and whippings of old, in order to liken the 
Act’s requirements to “punishment.”80  Rejecting that argument, however, 
the Court refused to consider as punishment the mere “dissemination of in-
formation” or the publication of truthful, formally available information.81  
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy distinguished the physical, corpo-
real “direct confrontation” from the “dissemination of accurate information 
about a criminal record, most of which is already public.”82  Moreover, to 
the extent that “adverse consequences” flowed from that dissemination, 
such results were not the direct purpose of the regulatory scheme.83 
Thus, unlike the Court in both Reporters Committee and Whalen, in 
Smith the Court seemed indifferent to the implications of rendering infor-
mation more easily and widely distributed, choosing instead to focus on its 
technical availability.  That point is particularly salient with regard to the 
Court’s dismissal of the impact of internet publication, which it said served 
only to “increase[] in proportion” the degree of humiliation.84  The corres-
 
 76. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).  Smith was also decided with a companion case, Connecticut 
Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003). 
 77. Smith, 538 U.S. at 89. 
 78. Id. at 93. 
 79. Id. at 92-93.  For a discussion of the civil/punitive divide as regards this case, see 
generally Murphy, supra note 2, at 1351-58. 
 80. Smith, 538 U.S. at 98-99. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 99. 
 84. Id.  Justice Thomas, concurring, took issue with the Court’s discussion of Internet 
distribution as the means of dissemination, as it was not specifically provided for in the sta-
tute.  Id. at 106-07 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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ponding simplicity and breadth of disclosure was wholly irrelevant to the 
analysis; the Court likened the online registry to “a visit to an official arc-
hive of criminal records,” which was simply “more efficient, cost effective, 
and convenient for Alaska’s citizenry” by virtue of being online.85  The 
Court later identified the negative consequences of the statute as flowing 
from “the fact of conviction, already a matter of public record” rather than 
from the broad disclosure and broadcast provisions of the statute.86  In sum, 
unlike the analysis in Reporters Committee and Whalen, the Court in Smith 
seemed wholly uninterested in the significance of databasing as an act that 
changes the nature of information in terms of its meaning and character.  
Rather, the database was simply another form of the same information, 
with no particular significance or power merely on account of its technical 
capacity. 
However, two Justices maintained that the compilation and ready availa-
bility of the information constituted a significant change from its prior pa-
per-and-archive existence.87  Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment, 
disputed that the Act “simply makes public information available in a new 
way,” noting that “[i]ts point, after all, is to send a message that probably 
would not otherwise be heard.”88  Justice Stevens likewise concluded that 
“there can be no doubt that the [w]idespread public access . . . to this per-
sonal and constantly updated information has a severe stigmatizing ef-
fect.”89  Overall, however, Smith, marked a fairly sharp departure from Re-
porters Committee and Whalen in its seeming indifference to arguments 
based on the special nature or character of information once collected in 
centralized databases. 
B. Evans and Herring 
The two most significant criminal procedure cases related to databasing 
occurred more recently, in the context of Fourth Amendment challenges to 
evidence seized as a result of erroneous information kept in a database.  
Both Arizona v. Evans,90 decided in 1994, and Herring v. United States,91 
 
 85. Id. at 99-100; see also id. at 105 (further dismissing the significance of the breadth 
of disclosure). 
 86. Id. at 101. 
 87. Justice Ginsburg, writing in dissent for herself and Justice Breyer, found the Act un-
constitutionally punitive in an opinion that did not specially address the significance of the 
creation of a centralized database of information. See id. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 109 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 89. Id. at 111-12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citation and quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 90. 514 U.S. 1 (1994). 
 91. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
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decided in 2009, held the exclusionary rule inapplicable to the fruits of un-
constitutional searches conducted in reasonable reliance on a database entry 
later proven to have been inaccurate.  In Evans, the error stemmed from the 
failure of a judicial court clerk to clear a quashed warrant from a computer 
database;92 in Herring, the same mistake occurred, but this time under the 
watch of a police department clerk.93  The Court in both cases ruled the ex-
clusionary rule inapplicable, citing deterrence as the primary purpose for 
the rule and the absence of a deterrence rationale for reasonable record-
keeping errors.94 
In both cases, the Court briefly discussed the procedures used to enter 
and clear warrants in the computer, although in both cases those procedures 
relied upon factual development, as opposed to statutory or regulatory 
analysis.95  In both cases, the Court mentioned the error rate for the data-
base in question, although in both cases that error rate was the subject of 
dispute.96  And in both cases, the Justices making up the majority took 
pains to consider overtly the fact that a database was the source of error, 
even while ultimately dismissing those implications for purposes of resolv-
ing the instant case. 
Specifically, in Evans three concurring justices (Justices O’Connor, Sou-
ter, and Breyer) expressed considerable concern about the nature of the er-
ror as a recordkeeping error that occurred as a result of departure from es-
tablished protocol.97  They specifically worried about databases—“the 
advent of powerful, computer-based recordkeeping systems that facilitate 
arrests in ways that have never before been possible.”98  Cautioning that 
such technology, while beneficial, ought not to be relied upon “blindly,” 
they warned that reliance on a system with “no mechanism to ensure its ac-
curacy over time” would invoke the exclusionary rule.99 
 
 92. Evans, 514 U.S. at 5. 
 93. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698-99. 
 94. Id. at 703-04; Evans, 514 U.S. at 15-16. 
 95. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698; Evans, 514 U.S. at 5 (describing testimony). 
 96. Compare Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704 (citing testimony that no other errors of this 
kind had ever occurred), and Evans, 514 U.S. at 15 (citing testimony that “this type of error 
occurred once every three or four years”), with Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 n.1 (debating cha-
racterization of error as “negligent” or not) and Evans, 514 U.S. at 27-28 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (observing both that the witness later admitted to three of the same kind of errors 
that day, and also recounting prominent cases of similar error).  See also Herring, 129 S. Ct. 
at 704 & n.5 (noting dispute in testimony about whether the error occurred with greater fre-
quency than suggested). 
 97. See Evans, 514 U.S. at 16-17 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 98. Id. at 17. 
 99. Id. 
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Similarly, in Herring, Chief Justice Roberts stated that a showing that 
the police were “reckless in maintaining a warrant system” or had “kno-
wingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests” 
would invoke exclusionary rule protection.100  Demonstrated “systemic er-
rors” in a system might also render reliance on that system objectively un-
reasonable.101  But such errors must manifest as substantive mistakes (say, 
repeated reliance on bad information), rather than on demonstrated proce-
dural infirmities (say, a lack of established protocols).  Thus, absent evi-
dence—most obviously offered by the defendant challenging the action—
that a system had “routine or widespread” deficiencies, the evidence seized 
by an officer in reliance on information gleaned from an erroneous data-
base entry would be admissible. 
The dissenters in Evans each focused particularly on the specific impli-
cations of database error.  Justice Stevens observed that the exclusionary 
rule operated to deter “systemically,” not just on an individual officer lev-
el.102  He chastised the Court for “overlook[ing] the reality that computer 
technology has changed the nature of threats to citizens’ privacy over the 
past half century.”103  Justice Stevens also refused to presume that the data-
base was kept in an orderly fashion, calling the testimony “slim evidence 
on which to base a conclusion that computer error poses no appreciable 
threat to Fourth Amendment interests.”104  Lastly, he conjured the specter 
of erroneous arrests attributable to “some bureaucrat” who “has failed to 
maintain an accurate computer data base.”105 
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting separately and joined by Justice Stevens, 
opened by warning about the “evolving problem” of “the increasing use of 
computer technology in law enforcement.”106  She went on to discuss a 
theme that she picked up again in her dissent in Herring,107 noting that the 
lower courts found Supreme Court precedent “not helpful” in resolving the 
issues.108  Justice Ginsburg agreed that the problem was not just “a court 
 
 100. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703. 
 101. Id. at 704. 
 102. Evans, 514 U.S. at 21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In fairness, Justice Stevens’ observa-
tion was more motivated by the systemic relationship between the law enforcement and 
judicial branches, as opposed to the many operators within a law enforcement (or database) 
system. 
 103. Id. at 22. 
 104. Id. at 21-22. 
 105. Id. at 23. 
 106. Id. (Ginbsurg, J., dissenting). 
 107. The Herring dissenters largely mirrored the justices that either dissented in Evans or 
else concurred with specific reservations related to database entry.  Justice O’Connor, who 
had joined the concurrers in Evans, had left the Court by the time that Herring was decided. 
 108. Evans, 514 U.S. at 24. 
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employee’s slip” but rather the “‘potential for Orwellian mischief’ in the 
government’s increasing reliance on computer technology in law enforce-
ment.”109 
In an opinion thoroughly dedicated to assessing the impact of these new 
technologies, Justice Ginsburg asserted that “[w]idespread reliance on 
computers to store and convey information generates, along with manifold 
benefits, new possibilities of error.”110  Moreover, “computerization greatly 
amplifies an error’s effect,” because the error can seep out across a wide 
variety of systems.111  Citing examples of harassing and dangerous arrests 
based on erroneous computer data,112 Justice Ginsburg worried about leav-
ing such databases constitutionally unregulated absent a showing of delibe-
rate error. 
Her dissent, this time on behalf of Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, 
echoed the same themes.  Rather than accept the database on its face and 
assume it optimally operative, she elaborated the many shortcomings of its 
current configuration.113  For example, she cited the lack of obvious elec-
tronic connections between information terminals, the entirely uncontrolled  
procedures for inputting and extracting information, and the lack of routine 
oversight or maintenance for quality control purposes.114  By comparison, 
she noted that the national database system, the NCIC, had numerous safe-
guards in place both to control the quality of information stored and to mi-
nimize the adverse consequences of error.115  In short, Justice Ginsburg 
demanded some evidence of good database management, rather than trust 
that such practices were in place absent evidence of bad outputs.116  
In sum, a variety of lessons emerge from a review of the Court’s major 
efforts to examine the constitutional significance of criminal justice-related 
databases.  Perhaps most evident from the foregoing discussion is its over-
all failure to articulate a consistent vision of the constitutional significance 
of the aggregation and easy retrieval and dissemination of otherwise law-
fully held—and even publicly available—information.  Many of the cases 
were largely driven by statutory analyses, and yet not all databases are go-
 
 109. Id. at 25. 
 110. Id. at 26. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 27. 
 113. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 708-09 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 709-10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Indeed, she worried both that it would be 
difficult to identify the source of error in many cases and that defendants (especially indi-
gent ones) would have trouble obtaining the information necessary to make such a showing. 
Id. 
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verned by elaborate statutory regimes.  Moreover, the degree to which the 
Court undertook its own assessment of the manner in which centralization 
and digitalization of records transformed the significance of those records 
seemed to vary case-by-case.  To be sure, much of that variation may be 
attributable to political or ideological differences among justices and courts 
over time.  But it may also be that databasing is sufficiently new, and suffi-
ciently untested, that a template for a more sensitive inquiry has yet to be 
developed. 
III.  THE SLIPPAGE BETWEEN DOCTRINE AND DATABASES 
What might databasing mean for rules of criminal justice?  Or, more 
specifically, what does the emergence of the database mean for the proce-
dural rules that have governed how we think about police investigations 
and criminal adjudication?  About evidence and adversary process?  How 
do the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments hold up in a newly intercon-
nected world?  As shown, the Supreme Court has paid scant (and inconsis-
tent) heed to the peculiar features of databasing or to what special concerns 
might inform the investigations conducted or evidence collected from 
them.  There is no idea of “database cases” the way there are “informant 
cases” or “confession cases” or even “wiretap cases.”117 
This Part sketches five presumptions that seem to cloud the assessment 
of evidence and information gleaned from databasing.  The fact that many 
of these characteristics occur individually with regard to more conventional 
forms of evidence helps only to obscure the particular havoc they can 
wreak when aligned together in a single form, such as databasing.  But past 
experience with these presumptions might also help shed light on the best 
way to analyze database cases going forward. Articulating these presump-
tions enables a clearer appraisal of the ways in which databases operate, 
thereby exposing the particular risks that attend the use of databases in 
criminal justice.   
A. The Presumption of Ready Analogy 
A strong inclination exists to ignore the ways in which databases trans-
form information and instead characterize them as identical to, or at most 
as simply more efficient forms of, other kinds of information collection.  
Typical is the assertion in Whalen that the centralized collection of pre-
scription records for databasing was “not significantly different” than that 
which existed when prescriptions were subject to other forms of limited 
 
 117. But see Evans, 514 U.S. at 17 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (likening the desire to see 
standards for databases to a similar approach to informants). 
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disclosure.118  The Court in Smith similarly analogized the collection and 
dissemination of conviction records online to a simply more efficient form 
of historical archiving.119 
I have elsewhere written at length about the dangers of viewing technol-
ogical incursions onto privacy as significant only inasmuch as they mirror 
physical ones,120 and so will not elaborate on that assertion here.  What is 
significant, however, is that the reliance on non-technological precursors to 
legitimate technology-based regimes serves to excuse courts from having to 
seriously contemplate both the actual steps required to construct and oper-
ate a database, as well as the new or innovative ways in which information 
may be used as a result.  If an electronic or online repository of convictions 
is considered identical to a paper one, then courts need not inquire into the 
complicated questions of algorithms or file maintenance or dissemination 
or interception methods. 
Moreover, databases may simply gain authority by association: if law 
enforcement has kept fingerprints of criminals for a hundred years, why 
should any court revisit their continued preservation?  Never mind that, for 
most of those hundred years, the dusty and disintegrating fingerprint cards 
existed in thousands of drawers in hundreds of decentralized sheriff’s of-
fices, whereas now they will be instantly accessible and electronically sear-
chable anywhere in the world.  The utility of the analogy is that it bypasses 
the need for careful consideration of the details of databasing—the nitty 
gritty operational information about inputs and outputs that would require 
careful reconsideration and possible intervention in areas of otherwise 
longstanding familiarity. 
B. The Presumption of Demonstrable Harm 
Similarly, databases benefit from the general requirement that constitu-
tional violations allege actual and not speculative harms.  The moment of 
judicial confrontation with a database system almost always occurs long 
after the optimal moment for oversight or control.  Thus, it is easy to as-
sume that databasing itself is harmless, or at best generates speculative po-
tential injury to a range of individuals as innumerable as the database’s ca-
pacity itself.  And yet the mere risk of harm has long been deemed an 
insufficiently worthwhile target of constitutional attention, and it is unwiel-
dy even to imagine defining parameters for the minimization of such risks 
in the absence of specific instances of injury.   
 
 118. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977). 
 119. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98-100 (2003). 
 120. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 1345-64. 
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This presumption is particularly pernicious when it comes to databasing, 
however, since the faulty products of a database can go entirely unnoticed 
under current doctrine even when they are common and recurring.  Consid-
er the debate in Herring itself:  the majority demanded evidence that the 
database routinely produced bad information, refusing to consider the ab-
sence of quality control mechanisms itself a sufficient “harm.”  Yet a data-
base that generates bad information—say, that falsely reports arrest war-
rants—may produce many arrests, but little record of those arrests.  Unless 
the arrested person sues civilly, or is found in violation of contraband (as in 
the case of Herring), no formal record of the error may be made.  And even 
if formal suits are filed, it may be difficult to link them to one another as 
the product of a faulty database.  The only proof of the reliability of the da-
tabase in Herring itself were the statements of its keepers—hardly disinte-
rested parties—and yet, even those were contested factually. 
Lastly, to wait until harm does result may often foreclose real remedy.  
The diffused and decentralized nature of databases may make error correc-
tion difficult.  Back-up records may have to be obtained and destroyed.  In-
accurate or obsolete information may have spread virally throughout net-
works and be virtually impossible to recall.  Indeed, a database error, like 
the database itself, often can be more conceptual than real—it may less be 
about a server with a bunch of ones and zeros that require erasing than it is 
about a patchwork of information let loose in a web of systems.  Once the 
information is released, it carries its own momentum, and eradicating it 
from every system may simply not be possible. 
C. The Presumption of Regularity 
Databases also appear to benefit from the strong presumption of regu-
larity that attaches to most law enforcement actions.  This presumption, as 
applied to the behavior of individual officers, tends to spring partly from an 
institutional desire to defer to the expertise of the executive branch in con-
ducting investigations and partly from the recognition that assessing the 
subjective motivations of individual persons is difficult at best.  But even 
though no equivalent functional or institutional justification impels the 
same deference when it comes to databases, there nevertheless exists the 
tendency to exercise it. 
Regarding databases, the presumption of regularity means that, absent 
affirmative evidence that a database is kept in a shoddy or substandard fa-
shion, courts will assume the soundness of the information generated.  Not-
ably, this presumption seems to hold even when information about the pro-
cedures or practices governing the collection and maintenance of the 
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database is lacking,121 either because the record was not developed factual-
ly or because the oversight structures for the database are entirely informal.  
Thus, unlike areas of constitutional criminal procedure in which articula-
tion of formal restraints, and compliance with them, dictates the acceptabil-
ity of a particular action,122 database cases can be decided largely ad hoc. 
As a corollary to this presumption of regularity, databases also seem to 
benefit from the fact that they may spring from organic enabling statutes.  
Courts can therefore rely upon a statutory regime to guide and govern re-
view of the database, rather than grasp at uncertain constitutional doctrine.  
Conversely, administrative compliance with statutory provisions about da-
tabase parameters may shield against claims that the database is impeding 
or contravening constitutional interests. 
D. The Presumption of Individual Action 
Relatedly, databases can benefit from the difficulty that courts encounter 
in fitting the actual activity of databasing into conventional molds for po-
lice behavior.  A database is typically not the product of any single individ-
ual actor; it may not even be the product of a single police force.  Rather, 
databases are the ultimate collaborative projects.  They may require myriad 
inputs and enable equally diverse outputs.  They may cross jurisdictional 
borders or require public-private sector cooperation. 
By way of example, consider a database as simple even as the one raised 
in Whalen.  The database software must be created by computer scientists, 
and the hardware kept and operated by technologists.  Doctors create the 
source information, which must be transferred to a variety of state officials 
responsible for inputting it into the machine.  The hard copies of the infor-
mation must then be tended and eventually destroyed.  The physical storage 
mechanism—there, magnetic tapes—must be kept and safeguarded, and 
then perhaps operated and searched when appropriate.  They too must be 
regularly maintained to ensure compliance with regulatory restrictions and 
destruction of data when appropriate.  Throughout all of this, technology 
may evolve such that the magnetic tape or machines or the software be-
comes outdated or obsolete, and the process begins anew.  And that is just 
one state’s simple prescription registry, accessible to only a limited number 
 
 121.  See, e.g., Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698 (“For whatever reason, the information about 
the recall of the warrant for Herring did not appear in the database.”). 
 122.  For example, the Constitution requires suppression of a confession obtained in vi-
olation of Miranda, even if a particular defendant might be shown to be aware of the rights 
without warning, see, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004), or suppres-
sion of evidence gathered in violation of the warrant requirement, even if it is clear that one 
could have readily been obtained, see, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
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of state officials and operated (the Court took great pains to state) out of 
one room in Albany.  A diffused networked system of information like 
NCIC or the DNA databank or the sex offender registries raises a whole 
new complex of problems.  In sum, a “database” is often a misleadingly 
singular concept that in fact embodies multifold layers of individuals and 
objects, that can span both geographical and temporal boundaries. 
E. The Presumption of Technological Neutrality 
As a companion to the presumption of regularity, databases also re-
mained cloaked in a powerful technological neutrality.  The symbolic and 
actual manifestation of the database as a computerized technology helps to 
neutralize it.  Disembodied from the human beings that define, create, real-
ize, and benefit from its parameters, the database is easily viewed as incap-
able of bias in the way that human law enforcement agents might be. 
That is, although courts of course recognize that a human being might 
create false entries in a database or intentionally manipulate information, 
the underlying architecture of the database is largely ignored as a human 
event.  It has long been a familiar cautionary refrain that police officers are 
engaged in the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime” and thus 
might act with understandable, but impermissible, zeal.  But no companion 
notion exists with regard to databases: we do not conceive of databases as 
themselves acting “zealously.” 
Yet databases mirror and replicate human predispositions, and they can-
not operate wholly divorced from them.  What information is selected for 
input, how it is input, how it will be searchable—all of these values are de-
fined by humans and therefore replicate human judgments about the rela-
tive importance and ordering of information.  The database cannot commu-
nicate wholly neutrally: it always functions in the shadow of the human 
hand. 
In short, databases are essentially human.  Indeed, the way in which in-
formation is stored and retrieved may itself communicate predilections and 
biases.  For example, DNA match probabilities are expressly quantified in 
racial terms that relate to individual self-identification rather than actual bi-
ological ancestry. Despite the patina of technological perfection, databases 
are ultimately compilations of human knowledge—created, maintained, 
and used by humans.  It is flawed human beings that collect their informa-
tion, write their operating codes, input their entries, maintain their systems, 
and search and retrieve their data.  Databases may represent turbo-charged 
knowledge—but it is still human knowledge, just more powerful. 
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IV.  TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF 
DATABASES 
If these erroneous presumptions represent pits into which constitutional 
analysis is prone to fall when confronted with database technology, then 
what considerations might instead better govern or shape constitutional 
doctrine in this area?  This Part offers five characteristics that define data-
bases, and that merit acknowledgment in any honest constitutional inquiry.  
In outlining these qualities, my goal is to encourage direct thinking about 
databases, both in how they might conflict with some of the conventional 
models that guide constitutional doctrine as well as raise new concerns as 
yet unrecognized.  Supplanting faulty stereotypical presumptions with de-
scriptively accurate ones will hopefully facilitate development of doctrine 
that guides the formulation of appropriate constraints on database use and 
deployment, while eliminating constraints that unnecessarily impede it.  
The ideal is to acknowledge the ways in which databases represent a new 
form of collection, use, and dissemination of information and capitalize on 
those strengths while minimizing the weaknesses. 
By way of clarification, my aim is more to think about the meaning of 
databases than the meaning of constitutional doctrine.  That is, the qualities 
identified below to some extent transcend the particular constitutional doc-
trines at issue.  Criminal justice database challenges can arise under a varie-
ty of constitutional clauses—including most obviously Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure, Fifth Amendment due process and self-incrimination, 
and Sixth Amendment confrontation, compulsory process, and right to 
counsel.  But, for purposes of this Article, the specific contours of particu-
lar doctrine is less important than the shared features that inhere across da-
tabases generally, and which might help illuminate constitutional questions 
regardless of the particular claim at issue. 
A. Structural (vs. Individual) Oversight 
Perhaps the most singular trait that differentiates databases is that they 
require structural, rather than individual, oversight.  That is, constitutional 
doctrines in criminal justice tend to particularize—they assume individual 
actors and individual actions.  The archetypal criminal investigation is of 
the individual criminal, committing an individual crime (or series of them), 
investigated by individual officers.  Thus, the system is structured accor-
dingly: it restrains individual police officers through the Fourth Amend-
ment, or respects individual rights through the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments, and adjudicates individual claims through the Sixth Amendment 
processes.  It seeks to resolve a single case or controversy. 
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Even to the extent that constitutional criminal procedure wrangles with 
entities, it does so awkwardly.  Courts often reach for analogies to the indi-
vidual or to personalization of a collective, rather than wholly alter the doc-
trinal approach.  For instance, corporate liability simply substitutes a single, 
fictional corporate entity for an individual one.  Or doctrines of racketeer-
ing liability serve to penalize groups of individuals by imputing liability for 
the actions taken by others with whom they associate.  The collective large-
ly evades us.  We still depend on the Constitution to regulate investigations 
by regulating the actions of individual officers (through search and seizure 
and interrogation), and to regulate adjudication through inquiry of evidence 
related to an individual case (through case-specific discovery, cross-
examination, assistance of counsel, and burdens of proof or evidentiary 
rules). 
Databases, however, require a different tactic.  Investigations of one per-
son cannot be neatly disaggregated from that of others in the database; nor 
can adjudication be relied upon to expose shortcomings or flaws in the col-
lection of evidence.  Databases are rarely the product of one individual’s 
action, and rarely contain easily separable individual information.  Instead, 
they tend to be the product of numerous actors and inputs and collate nu-
merous tiers of information.  Think about Herring: an anonymous person 
put in the erroneous information, or else failed to remove it; then the in-
formation was accessed by one clerk and transmitted to another who failed 
to undertake any steps to verify it.123  It is difficult, and maybe impossible, 
to identify the moment the error occurred or the individual who perpetrated 
it.  It is likewise futile to attempt to regulate databases with reference to on-
ly one constituent part or one discrete moment of constitutional signific-
ance.  The database’s very purpose is to derive information from myriad 
inputs that stretch over time. 
Take, for example, the DNA database.  The DNA database is in itself 
largely a fiction; even the name of the federal database, CODIS, reveals as 
much.  CODIS, or the Combined DNA Index System, in fact refers not to a 
central repository of information, but rather to the software used by the in-
dividual law enforcement entities that have met the standards and entered 
into an agreement to share data.124  Each local or state entity uploads basic 
information to a centralized repository, and automated or intentional 
searches then indicate matches that can be pursued by contacting the up-
loading agency.  Thus, to the extent that CODIS even exists, it incarnates 
 
 123.  Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698. 
 124. Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second 
Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 739 (2007). 
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as a pointer system—it tells a user where to look for the source information 
to which they have generated a match. 
Moreover, the stored information itself is a product of a chain of infor-
mation generation: the chemical and mechanical technologies required to 
type and analyze a genetic sample, the analyst who must interpret and enter 
the data, and the engineers that write the software code and maintain and 
superintend the databases themselves.  Within each category are subcatego-
ries of data technicians, analysts, and law enforcement agents, each with a 
particular role to play that is essential to the creation and maintenance of 
the database.  And this description only scratches the surface; the DNA da-
tabase also depends upon other databases in order to draw meaning.  With-
out sub-databases of profiles collected to gauge population frequencies, for 
instance, it is impossible to state with certainty what the significance of a 
DNA match is at all. 
Thus, to the extent that oversight of the integrity of such databases is to 
occur, or that constitutional doctrine intends to regulate their formation and 
use, any such oversight must inevitably operate structurally, not individual-
ly.  Yet doctrine is currently ill-suited to such a task.  To the extent that 
there is any notion of database oversight, it ill-accommodates this kind of 
structural, overarching approach.  An individual model focuses on what 
happens in a particular case, and which individuals interfaced with the da-
tabase in that instance (who loaded a sample, or ran a search, for example), 
without considering that person within the larger web of inputs and outputs 
necessary to the databases’ continued operation. 
This kind of myopia is understandable, however, given the highly tai-
lored and individualized notion of criminal justice that has typified the An-
glo-American system.  Indeed, some critics lament that American justice is 
so intensely myopic that it unnecessarily excludes even highly probative 
evidence of general propensities, even limited to a particular individual.125  
The current model of adjudication is ill-suited to the task of reviewing and 
assessing evidence derived from databases.  The procedural entitlements of 
the adversary system depend upon matched opposing forces engaging in a 
contest to resolve discrete disputed facts.  Tools such as cross-examination 
or compulsory process cannot sweep broadly enough to disclose systemic 
failings.126  Discovery, compulsory process, or cross-examination in a sin-
 
 125.  Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the “Grotesque” Doctrine of Character Evi-
dence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological Research,  36 SW. U. L. 
REV. 741, 743-45 (2008). 
 126. See, e.g., Ken Strutin, Databases, E-Discovery and Criminal Law, 15 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 6, 14-16 (2009) (discussing United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 
1970)). 
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gle case yields little opportunity to identify and uncover, much less broadly 
correct, errors apt to occur (and be visible) only from scrutiny on a system-
ic level. 
Any truly effective constitutional doctrine for databases will have to 
contend with their multifaceted and interdependent, rather than discrete and 
intimate, operation.  It will also have to provide a means of access to in-
formation created and held by private entities, yet used for the benefit of 
public criminal justice actors.  A structural approach, rather than a model 
that presumes individual investigative or adjudicative oversight, is re-
quired, and it may be that new monitoring institutions should be developed. 
  Such a shift requires a major reorientation in constitutional thinking.  
Rather than ask about individual actors’ specific behaviors—a substantive 
approach, in some respects—a procedural inquiry that asks about the exis-
tence of protocols and monitoring systems would be preferred.  In other 
words, it is arguably impossible to regulate databases substantively—to tru-
ly inquire whether a particular series of tests or entries or searches were ac-
curate, fair, and correct.  But it is much easier to impose procedural re-
quirements upon databases—to inquire into the existence and thoroughness 
of protocols for those processes and to presume inadequate or defective any 
database system maintained without them.  Certain structural devices are 
demonstrably effective in minimizing mistakes, and with greater attention, 
others would be uncovered.  A constitutional doctrine that looks for the 
signs of good management—think scrutiny of policies for access controls, 
or regular audits, or blind tests—is far more likely to improve database 
deployments in society than one that attempts to determine whether a data-
base has failed or not in a case-specific context. 
B. Suspicionless (vs. Suspicion-Based) Targeting 
Concomitant with recognition of the structural rather than individual na-
ture of database systems is an acknowledgement that, as a result, databases 
can (and often do) yield information divorced from individual suspicion of 
a particular person.  That is, databases can function both to identify and to 
confirm.  In the confirmatory mode, the search for information is tar-
geted—a user seeks particular information about a particular person, based 
on suspicion or other information.  The information in the database simply 
confirms—perhaps rapidly or more comprehensively—the suspicions al-
ready held.  For example, a known suspect’s records are searched for a 
criminal past, or a DNA match, or evidence that she crossed a bridge or 
made a call. 
In the identification mode, in contrast, the user is more or less dispassio-
nate about the ultimately identified individual—the database, in essence, 
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chooses the suspect.  The known information is the input, and its relation-
ship to a criminal act; what the database supplies is a match or list of sus-
pects—the building blocks, or final nail, of the investigation. 
By way of example, think of a cell phone call record database.  If an in-
vestigator seeks all the calls made from a particular phone, or set of phones, 
then the investigator seeks to confirm or dispel suspicion related to the 
holders of those numbers.  But an investigator might also seek the identity 
of all callers who contacted the homicide victim, say, or whose calls were 
routed through a particular tower at a particular time.  In this usage, the in-
vestigator relies upon the database to identify the suspect, independent 
from the investigator’s own suspicions about the likeliest suspect. 
The difference in these two modes of operation matters greatly.  Where 
databases are used to confirm otherwise-held suspicions, they more tradi-
tionally resemble other traditional forms of police investigation.  But the 
use of databases to generate suspects represents a new kind of investigation 
altogether—whether based on particular information (e.g., “who called this 
number”) or upon predefined algorithms (e.g., “who has traveled to these 
three countries and bought these two items within a one month period”). 
Suspicion models that constrain investigation, therefore, will both over-
regulate and under-regulate the use of databases in this context.127  The 
great fear with regard to this kind of databasing is, in Dan Solove’s formu-
lation, the fear of the anonymous bureaucrat, not the malevolent inspec-
tor.128  The restraints called for will inevitably falter if they presume the 
need for the overzealous, overstepping constable.  The true risk is a leap-
ing-to-conclusions, or confirmation bias.  It is the fear that the individual 
will be sucked into a morass of suspicion from which escape is arduous or 
impossible—Kafka’s The Trial, not Orwell’s Big Brother.129 
Conversely, the need to constrain such searches due to lack of suspicion 
may in fact constitute unnecessary overreaching.  The invasion of privacy 
occasioned by physical confrontations, or even informational inquiries, 
conducted by police against suspected individuals raises a different tenor of 
concern than that represented by search queries into established and regu-
lated databases.  Many of these database searches—for the DNA match, the 
license plate match, the cell phone callers—will be troubling inasmuch as 
the composition of the database reflects some troubling inequities, or inas-
 
 127. Chris Slobogin makes a similar argument with regard to individual versus group 
searches. See Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological 
Age?, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE CONSTITUTION 30 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds.) 
(forthcoming 2010). 
 128. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 36-42. 
 129. Id. at 31, 41-43. 
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much as what follows next raises issues.  The search in itself is not the 
problem, and questions like reasonable suspicion or probable cause carry 
little meaning. 
A constitutional doctrine obsessed with suspicion standards, however, 
misses this point.  Suspicion standards help winnow the number and degree 
of interests affected by law enforcement actions, but when a database 
search is at issue, those are the wrong metrics.  And the converse im-
pulse—to simply ignore that there is any special import to a database 
search—is equally undesirable.  Database searches arguably enhance pri-
vacy in that they are often anonymous, virtual (rather than physical), and 
suspicionless—those qualities increase the likelihood that they are executed 
unobtrusively and neutrally.  But they do not spread their burdens equitably 
if they are not fairly composed and adequately monitored.  Thus, it is these 
latter questions that should serve as the gates of entry to relatively unfet-
tered use of databases, rather than to abandon any effort to regulate them at 
all or to attempt to impose suspicion-based models where they ill fit. 
C. Operative Opacity (vs. Transparency) 
Relatedly, databases do not just generate information anonymously; they 
tend to operate anonymously, as well.  Database content is typically 
shrouded in secrecy.  And such secrecy is usually desirable—the mere ef-
fort required to compile and organize the information they contain 
represents a major investment, which the investing parties typically have 
little incentive or desire to expose.  This tendency often serves to help pro-
tect information, since databases frequently compile information on sensi-
tive topics, whether it is the criminal history of an individual or the fact that 
they possess certain characteristics.  Generally speaking, the secrecy of da-
tabases is desirable—this is precisely why the possibility of “hacking” da-
tabases generates such loud objections, and why privacy experts demand 
myriad safeguards on the integrity of the information they keep. 
Databases also are often, by their nature, secret from within.  They have 
multifarious inputs, which means both that the identity of the relevant agent 
can be difficult to discern, along with their responsibility for particular sub-
stance.  These ambiguities are exacerbated by the fact that a database can 
represent the product of public and private cooperation.  Thus, the rules and 
procedures that provide access to one set of database actors (say, the gov-
ernment officials that maintain and run them) may differ from the rules and 
procedures that govern access to a different set (say, a private company that 
creates the software). 
In some respects, the anonymity and diversity that characterizes databas-
es in turn serves to protect them from abuse.  The code that makes them 
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run, the operators that input data, and even the persons who access that data 
may all interact with the information in a nameless, faceless way.  Unlike 
the beat officer or public prosecutor, the technician need not have as per-
sonal a stake in the construction of the database or the outcome of a search.  
Each party may have a great interest in ensuring the integrity of their own 
component part or role, without having a vested interest in any particular 
outcome.  It may defuse some of the potency of the information held in da-
tabases if they are primarily composed of separate, neutralized parts. 
But the secrecy that protects databases from abuse may also often enable 
abuse from within.  With so many different entities at play, it can be both 
hard to monitor the quality of each contributor and difficult to use estab-
lished legal regimes to do so.  It is not as though there are procedures in the 
criminal justice system for a defendant to implead Applied Biosystems in 
order to gain access to primer sequences used for forensic DNA typing—
the only option is an awkward fumble with the jurisdiction’s rules of dis-
covery.  And given the Sixth Amendment’s parsimonious view of criminal 
discovery, there is no guarantee that those rules will suffice.130 
Litigation, as a formal and public event, also poorly serves as the vehicle 
for identifying and correcting problems that may arise in database adminis-
tration.  The secrecy with which most databases are kept is, as previously 
observed, largely desirable.  Compilations of sensitive or proprietary in-
formation should not be cavalierly put out for public display.  But there is a 
strong presumption of openness for court records and hearings, and order-
ing disclosures even in a controlled or sealed environment risks leaks.  Un-
derstandably, then, courts might hesitate before commanding that Google 
turn over its billion dollar search algorithms or that the federal government 
hand over its database to every criminal defendant for research. 
It is too much to require courts, or to expect the Constitution, to demand 
full transparency in the methods of database administrators.  But courts, 
and the Constitution, can demand transparency in the articulation and ap-
plication of consequences to those administrators’ efforts.  Courts can re-
quire that the database undergo regular, demonstrably effective auditing 
processes, and ask to see proof of such.  They can view the absence of in-
formation about the database—such as how often it is used, how often it is 
audited, what the results are—as a sign that the database is inadequately at-
tended, rather than as confirmation of its reliability. 
 
 130. The only real constitutional rule is that exculpatory information be turned over. See 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1963). 
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D. Use (vs. Acquisition) Restrictions 
Databasing also requires reconsideration of the current focus upon regu-
lating the acquisition of information while ignoring its subsequent mainten-
ance or use.  Fourth Amendment doctrine scrupulously attends to how in-
formation is acquired, resting largely upon a premise of a physical dimen-
dimension to the moment.  The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test 
once promised to consider “people, not places,” but that exhortation has 
largely reverted to a highly material standard for the constitutional thre-
shold that barely corresponds to individuals’ actual subjective expecta-
tions.131  The Sixth Amendment likewise strongly preserves the encounter 
between accused and evidence—the physical face-to-face confrontation 
embodied in cross-examination—as represented by the Supreme Court’s 
recent jurisprudence privileging in-court accusation over other, arguably 
more effective, forms of confronting evidence.132 
But the import and the impact of a database occurs less with regard to 
the moment of the information’s acquisition than with all the moments that 
then may follow.  Indeed, acquisition may not represent any kind of threat 
to individual liberty or privacy at all.  Recall the criminal records database 
at issue in Reporters Committee—there, the Court acknowledged that the 
true significance of the database was not its contents, which were all tech-
nically a matter of public record, but the act of compiling and rendering 
that information accessible in a particular way.133 
Yet the salience of compiling or organizing information all too often re-
mains obscured in constitutional analysis.  Consider again, by way of ex-
ample, the DNA databases.  Almost all of the cases that have examined the 
constitutionality of collecting DNA samples from convicted persons, and 
some of the recent arrestee cases, have zeroed in on the moment of collec-
tion as the relevant point of inquiry.134  If collecting the sample is permissi-
ble, then the constitutional inquiry effectively ends. 
A more sensitive inquiry would require a more complicated disaggrega-
tion of the steps involved in creating and maintaining a DNA database.  It 
would care less about mere collection—an act which, in all candor, is ra-
 
 131. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SUR-
VEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 112 (2007). 
 132. See David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2010) (cri-
ticizing the romanticization of cross-examination as a tool to uncover errors especially with 
regard to certain kinds of evidence, such as the scientific evidence that now pervades crimi-
nal cases, without inquiring whether other methods might in fact be more effective). 
 133.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764 
(1989). 
 134. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1358-62. 
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ther easily and painlessly accomplished with or without the consent of the 
person sampled—and focus instead upon the remaining moments in the 
process.135  The actual use of the samples—for instance, the kinds of tests 
used, the information potentially revealed, the validation and accuracy of 
the methods employed, and so on—might garner greater attention.136  The 
structure of the databasing of the information, including the manner of data 
entry, the steps taken to ensure accuracy, the approved duration of reten-
tion, and the means through which information can be retrieved would 
likewise merit scrutiny.  Lastly, the purpose to which the database could be 
put—not just as a function of the kinds of searches undertaken, but also as 
a function of the ends such searches intend to serve, would become a criti-
cal aspect of any review. 
In short, rather than follow an industrial age model reliant upon physical 
acquisition, constitutional doctrine would transition to an information age 
approach based on knowledge, creation, and dissemination.  Such atten-
tiveness would offer more effective safeguards around the creation and uti-
lization of databases, and be responsive to concerns about insufficient au-
diting structures and function creep.  Viewed as living, evolving organisms 
rather than as static repositories of discrete bits of information, the lawful-
ness and constitutionality of a database would more closely correspond to 
its actual use and deployment. 
 
 135.  As it is, the Supreme Court has suggested that the testing of biological material con-
stitutes a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 
U.S. 67, 76 (2001).  However, even in Ferguson, three Justices, including currently sitting 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, deemed the testing of the urine at issue to not constitute a 
search protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I suppose the 
testing of that urine for traces of unlawful drugs could be considered a search of sorts, but 
the Fourth Amendment protects only against searches of citizens’ ‘persons, houses, papers, 
and effects’; and it is entirely unrealistic to regard urine as one of the ‘effects’ (i.e., part of 
the property) of the person who has passed and abandoned.”); see also id. at 92-93 (“Some 
would argue . . . that testing of the urine is prohibited by some generalized privacy right 
‘emanating’ from the ‘penumbras’ of the Constitution (a question that is not before us); but 
it is not even arguable that the testing of urine that has been lawfully obtained is a Fourth 
Amendment search.  (I may add that, even if it were, the factors legitimizing the taking of 
the sample, which I discuss below, would likewise legitimize the testing of it.)”). 
 136. In the DNA cases, pains are often taken to characterize the typed information as 
“junk” as a means of assessing the privacy invasion, or to note that penalties attach to unau-
thorized uses of DNA samples. See, e.g., United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 947-48 (9th 
Cir. 2007).  But no federal appellate court has found the fact that the entire biological sam-
ple is retained (rather than just the “junk” numerical profile) relevant to its analysis, and 
most have relied upon the statutory penalties for “unauthorized” uses without worrying that 
the entity that defines “authorized” is the very one (law enforcement) that might have incen-
tives to overreach. See, e.g., Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 
2007). 
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E. Benign Neglect (vs. Deliberate Misdeeds) 
Finally, regulation of databases require constitutional criminal procedure 
to focus less upon deliberate or intentional abuses of power than upon unin-
tentional omissions, or mere benign neglect.  There is always the risk that a 
malfeasant actor will corrupt or exploit a database system, to be sure.  But 
constitutional regulation of databases aimed at ferreting out intentional 
harms will be very thin indeed; it is far easier to do harm, and far greater 
harm can be done, through mere benign neglect of database systems than 
through intentional manipulation. 
The split among the Justices in Herring starkly illustrate this distinction.  
The majority viewed the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule to be deter-
rence and concluded that applying the rule yielded little deterrent benefit 
with regard to a negligent recordkeeping error.137  In contrast, Justice Gins-
burg in dissent argued that more than marginal deterrence was possible, in 
the specific context of database entry, even when the complained of error 
constituted mere negligence in care.138 
Most tellingly, however, the majority of the court essentially presumed 
the regular operation of the database—even in the face of a factual dispute 
about the record in this regard139—whereas the dissenters questioned 
whether such evidence could in fact ever be effectively adduced.140  The 
dissenters in Herring talked about structural reforms and best practices—
they could not point to one operator that acted wrongfully or one rule that 
was flouted.  The dissenters, in other words, viewed deterrence as systemic 
because the database operated systemically, rather than view it as a ques-
tion of individual deterrence, related to one particular operator’s actions. 
To be sure, there are political and ideological fault lines that likely sepa-
rate the majority and the dissenters in Herring; their differences rest on 
more than mere perspective shifts in the meaning of databasing generally.  
But the debate is nonetheless illuminating in that it demonstrates how the 
very nature of databases—their opacity, anonymity, and systematic quali-
ties—can in turn enhance their invisibility to conventional constitutional 
doctrine. 
 
 137. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701, 703-04 (2009). 
 138. Id. at 708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the tort system is premised on deter-
rence for negligent actions). 
 139. Id. at 706 & n.2, 709. 
 140. Id. at 708-09. 
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CONCLUSION 
Information databases are an enduring part of the landscape of criminal 
justice—that much is obvious.  They are simply too valuable and too essen-
tial to the project of law enforcement to imagine discarding them altogeth-
er.  But the database model—what goes in them, how they are used, and 
what comes out—corresponds little to the models of criminal justice that 
have operated through the ages.  Attempts to shoehorn databases into cur-
rent doctrine have thus largely failed, and simply ignoring the differences 
risks leaving an important source for investigations and evidence wholly 
unregulated.  By identifying some of the shared, and inaccurate, presump-
tions that tend to shield databases from closer constitutional scrutiny, and 
then outlining some of their unique characteristics that merit special atten-
tion, this Article underscores the need for deliberate conversation about the 
significance of this new technology to current criminal justice frameworks. 
